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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
**Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and
the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory**

**Security Council
Sixty-third year**

**Identical letters dated 25 June 2008 from the Permanent Observer
of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

I regret to inform you that five days after the ceasefire was declared in the Gaza Strip, Israeli occupying forces committed yet another unprovoked military assault against the West Bank town of Nablus, threatening the fragile ceasefire and inciting further violence. In this regard and as we have called for repeatedly, we reaffirm the imperative of extending the ceasefire to the West Bank, as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank constitute one geographical unit — the Occupied Palestinian Territory — and, as such, Israeli military operations and attacks in either area have negative repercussions. Time and time again, such illegal, irresponsible and violent Israeli actions have served only to perpetuate the cycle of death and destruction on both sides and undermine all efforts to achieve calm and promote the peace process.

With regard to the recent attack in Nablus, in the early morning hours of Monday, 23 June 2008, Israeli occupying forces raided the student dormitory room of Iyad Khanfar and Tareq Abu Ghali, fourth year art students at Al-Najah University in Nablus, and opened fire at the two unarmed students, riddling their bodies with bullets. Israeli occupying forces then proceeded to surround the adjacent Salous and Masri buildings at 1.30 in the morning, shooting and firing sound bombs throughout the night, causing fear, panic and terror to spread among the civilian population in Nablus. The occupying forces also arrested five other men during this brutal incursion. In this regard, it is important to note that, despite the fact that Palestinian police have controlled Nablus since November 2007, Israel, the occupying Power, has never ceased its deadly and destructive incursions and its arbitrary arrests in Nablus and surrounding areas, undermining any Palestinian efforts, under the leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas, to restore law and order and to promote calm.

In addition, in the early morning hours of today, Israeli occupying forces opened random fire at an 80-year-old farmer as he tended to his field in the city of



Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip. He was seriously wounded and taken to a hospital for urgent treatment. Also today, Israel's Defence Minister announced that Israel would close the Gaza crossings indefinitely, a clear violation of the ceasefire agreement reached by the parties and one that will only result in the further impoverishment and humanitarian suffering of the Palestinian civilian population.

These alarming incidents of violence prove once again that the occupying Power's blatant violations of Palestinian rights, which it carries out with impunity, obstruct all efforts to achieve calm and threaten the ceasefire reached as a result of the intensive and commendable efforts by the Egyptian Government on 19 June. Clearly, Israeli military incursions and killings in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are not only grave violations of human rights, international law and international humanitarian law, but are also totally contrary to the efforts to promote a peace between the two sides.

The international community must hold Israel, the occupying Power, accountable for its breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights law in order to protect the Palestinian civilian population and encourage an atmosphere of calm and stability. Israel cannot continue to preach about its own security when it continuously violates the security of the entire Palestinian population under its occupation and jeopardizes the ceasefire. The Security Council, in particular, must uphold its Charter responsibilities and act to bring an end to all of the appalling crimes being committed by the occupying Power in all areas of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 316 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 18 June 2008 (A/ES-10/420-S/2008/404), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Riyad Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer

**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
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General Assembly
Sixty-second session
Agenda item 10
Report of the Peacebuilding Commission

Security Council
Sixty-third year

**Letter dated 23 June 2008 from the Acting Chairperson of the
Peacebuilding Commission and the Chairman of the Burundi
configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission to the President
of the General Assembly, the President of the Security Council
and the President of the Economic and Social Council**

We have the honour to refer to the recommendations of the biannual review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi (PBC/2/BDI/9).

On 23 June 2008, the Government of Burundi and the Peacebuilding Commission conducted the first biannual review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework and its Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism, which were adopted, respectively, on 20 June and 5 December 2007. The review noted that significant progress has been made in meeting several commitments contained in the Framework. However, additional efforts are needed, particularly in addressing the pressing issues of promotion of good governance; a comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération; security-sector reform; justice, promotion of human rights, and action to combat impunity; and the land issue and socio-economic recovery.

The biannual review meeting resulted in the adoption of succinct recommendations to the Government of Burundi, the United Nations, the international community and the Peacebuilding Commission. In accordance with paragraph 14 of the Peacebuilding Commission founding resolutions (General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005)), we would like to draw your attention to the recommendations addressed to the international community for follow-up action. In particular, attention is drawn to the recommendation contained in paragraph 28 pertaining to the mobilization and coordination of international assistance to Burundi.



The Peacebuilding Commission reiterates its determination to provide unflagging support to Burundi in the consolidation of peace with a view to securing a future that is free from fear and free from want.

(Signed) Carmen María **Gallardo Hernández**

Acting Chairperson
Peacebuilding Commission

(Signed) Johan L. **Løvald**

Chairman
Burundi configuration
Peacebuilding Commission



Security Council

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Letter dated 27 June 2008 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to respond to your report of 9 June 2008 (S/2008/372) detailing the closing of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Members of the Security Council support the actions and recommendations contained in the report regarding the disposition and safeguarding of the records and archives, strictly controlling access to archives provided by Member States in confidence or with proliferation potential and the disposition of non-expendable and other property. The Council would also like to thank the professional and support staff of UNMOVIC and the United Nations Special Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) (UNSCOM) for their dedicated and courageous work during the period of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC existence.

Members of the Security Council also welcome the report (see S/2008/350) submitted to the Council on 30 May 2008 by the Government of Iraq pursuant to paragraph 3 of Council resolution 1762 (2007).

(Signed) Zalmay Khalilzad
President of the Security Council



**Security Council**

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Belgium, Burkina Faso, Croatia, France, Italy, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1699 (2006), 1730 (2006), and 1735 (2006), and the relevant statements of its President,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed, and *reiterating* its unequivocal condemnation of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them, for ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts aimed at causing the death of innocent civilians and other victims, destruction of property and greatly undermining stability,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in leading and coordinating this effort,

Welcoming the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/60/288) of 8 September 2006 and the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system,

Reiterating its deep concern about the increased violent and terrorist activities in Afghanistan of the Taliban and Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them,

Recalling its resolution 1817 (2008) and *reiterating* its support for the fight against illicit production and trafficking of drugs from and chemical precursors to Afghanistan, in neighbouring countries, countries on trafficking routes, drug destination countries and precursors producing countries,



Expressing its deep concern about criminal misuse of the Internet by Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them, in furtherance of terrorist acts,

Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, and international and regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate, and incapacitate the terrorist threat,

Emphasizing that sanctions are an important tool under the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, and stressing in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of this resolution as a significant tool in combating terrorist activity,

Urging all Member States, international bodies, and regional organizations to allocate sufficient resources to meet the ongoing and direct threat posed by Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them, including by participating actively in identifying which individuals, groups, undertakings and entities should be subject to the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution,

Reiterating that dialogue between the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) ("the Committee") and Member States is vital to the full implementation of the measures,

Taking note of challenges to measures implemented by Member States in accordance with the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution and *recognizing* continuing efforts of Member States and the Committee to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities on the list created pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) (the "Consolidated List") and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions,

Reiterating that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law,

Emphasizing the obligation placed upon all Member States to implement, in full, resolution 1373 (2001), including with regard to the Taliban or Al-Qaida, and any individuals, groups, undertakings or entities associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, who have participated in financing, planning, facilitating, recruiting for, preparing, perpetrating, or otherwise supporting terrorist activities or acts, as well as to facilitate the implementation of counter-terrorism obligations in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions,

Welcoming the establishment by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1730 (2006) of the Focal Point within the Secretariat to receive de-listing requests, and *taking note* with appreciation of the ongoing cooperation between the Focal Point and the Committee,

Welcoming the continuing cooperation of the Committee and INTERPOL, in particular on the development of Special Notices, which assists Member States in their implementation of the measures, and recognizing the role of the Analytical

Support and Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team ("the Monitoring Team") in this regard,

Welcoming the continuing cooperation of the Committee with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in particular on technical assistance and capacity-building, to assist Member States in implementing their obligations under this and other relevant resolutions and international instruments,

Noting with concern the continued threat posed to international peace and security by Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, and *reaffirming* its resolve to address all aspects of that threat,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Measures

1. *Decides* that all States shall take the measures as previously imposed by paragraph 4(b) of resolution 1267 (1999), paragraph 8(c) of resolution 1333 (2000), and paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1390 (2002), with respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them, as referred to in the list created pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) (the "Consolidated List"):

(a) Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly for such persons' benefit, or by their nationals or by persons within their territory;

(b) Prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of these individuals, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals and this paragraph shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process or the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis only that entry or transit is justified;

(c) Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer, to these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned and technical advice, assistance, or training related to military activities;

2. *Reaffirms* that acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking, or entity is "associated with" Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban include:

(a) participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of;

(b) supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to;

- (c) recruiting for; or
- (d) otherwise supporting acts or activities of;

Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof;

3. *Further reaffirms* that any undertaking or entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by, or otherwise supporting, such an individual, group, undertaking or entity associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban shall be eligible for designation;

4. *Confirms* that the requirements in paragraph 1(a) above apply to financial and economic resources of every kind, including but not limited to those used for the provision of Internet hosting or related services, used for the support of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings, or entities associated with them;

5. *Encourages* Member States to continue their efforts to act vigorously and decisively to cut the flow of funds and other financial assets and economic resources to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban and other individuals, group, undertakings and entities associated with them;

6. *Decides* that Member States may permit the addition to accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 above of any payment in favour of listed individuals, groups, undertakings or entities, provided that any such payments continue to be subject to the provisions in paragraph 1 above and are frozen;

7. *Reaffirms* the provisions regarding available exemptions to the measures in paragraph 1(a) above, set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), and *reminds* Member States to use the procedures for exemptions as set out in the Committee's guidelines;

8. *Reiterates* the obligation of all Member States to implement and enforce the measures set out in paragraph 1 above, and *urges* all States to redouble their efforts in this regard;

Listing

9. *Encourages* all Member States to submit to the Committee for inclusion on the Consolidated List names of individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities participating, by any means, in the financing or support of acts or activities of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them, as described in paragraph 2 of resolution 1617 (2005) and reaffirmed in paragraph 2 above;

10. *Notes* that such means of financing or support include but are not limited to the use of proceeds derived from illicit cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotic drugs originating in Afghanistan, and their precursors;

11. *Reiterates* its call for continued cooperation between the Committee and the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), including by identifying individuals and entities participating in the financing or support of acts or activities of Al-Qaida and the Taliban as described in paragraph 30 of resolution 1806 (2008);

12. *Reaffirms* that, when proposing names to the Committee for inclusion on the Consolidated List, Member States shall act in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 1735 (2006) and provide a detailed statement of case, and *decides further* that for each such proposal Member States shall identify those parts of the statement of case that may be publicly released, including for use by the Committee for development of the summary described in paragraph 13 below or for the purpose of notifying or informing the listed individual or entity, and those parts which may be released upon request to interested States;

13. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in coordination with the relevant designating States, after a name is added to the Consolidated List, to make accessible on the Committee's website a narrative summary of reasons for listing for the corresponding entry or entries on the Consolidated List, and *further directs* the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in coordination with the relevant designating States, to make accessible on the Committee's website narrative summaries of reasons for listing for entries that were added to the Consolidated List before the date of adoption of this resolution;

14. *Calls upon* Member States, when proposing names to the Committee for inclusion on the Consolidated List to use the cover sheet in annex I of resolution 1735 (2006) and requests that they provide the Committee with as much relevant information as possible on the proposed name, in particular sufficient identifying information to allow for the positive identification of individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities by Member States, and directs the Committee to update the cover sheet in line with the provisions outlined in paragraphs 12 and 13 above;

15. *Decides* that the Secretariat shall, after publication but within one week after a name is added to the Consolidated List, notify the Permanent Mission of the country or countries where the individual or entity is believed to be located and, in the case of individuals; the country of which the person is a national (to the extent this information is known) in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1735 (2006);

16. *Underlines* the need for the prompt update of the Consolidated List on the Committee's website;

17. *Demands* that Member States receiving notification as in paragraph 15 above take, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, all possible measures to notify or inform in a timely manner the listed individual or entity of the designation and to include with this notification a copy of the publicly releasable portion of the statement of case, any information on reasons for listing available on the Committee's website, a description of the effects of designation, as provided in the relevant resolutions, the Committee's procedures for considering de-listing requests, and the provisions of resolution 1452 (2002) regarding available exemptions;

18. *Encourages* Member States receiving notification as in paragraph 15 above to inform the Committee on steps they have taken to implement the measures set out in paragraph 1 above, and on the measures taken in accordance with paragraph 17 above, and further encourages Member States to use the tools provided on the Committee's website to provide this information;

De-listing

19. *Welcomes* the establishment within the Secretariat of the Focal Point, pursuant to resolution 1730 (2006), that provides listed individuals, groups, undertakings or entities with the option to submit a petition for de-listing directly to the Focal Point;

20. *Urges* designating States and States of citizenship and residence to review de-listing petitions received through the Focal Point, in accordance with the procedures outlined in the annex to resolution 1730 (2006), in a timely manner and to indicate whether they support or oppose the request in order to facilitate the Committee's review;

21. *Directs* the Committee to continue to work, in accordance with its guidelines, to consider petitions for the removal from the Consolidated List of members and/or associates of the Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban who no longer meet the criteria established in the relevant resolutions;

22. *Directs* the Committee to consider an annual review of the names on the Consolidated List of individuals reported to be deceased, in which the names are circulated to the relevant states pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Committee guidelines, in order to ensure the Consolidated List is as updated and accurate as possible and to confirm that listing remains appropriate;

23. *Decides* that the Secretariat shall, within one week after a name is removed from the Consolidated List, notify the Permanent Mission of the country or countries where the individual or entity is believed to be located and, in the case of individuals, the country of which the person is a national (to the extent this information is known), and *demand*s that States receiving such notification take measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform the concerned individual or entity of the de-listing in a timely manner;

Review and maintenance of the Consolidated List

24. *Encourages* all Member States, in particular designating states and states of residence or nationality, to submit to the Committee additional identifying and other information, along with supporting documentation, on listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, including updates on the operating status of listed entities, groups and undertakings, the movement, incarceration or death of listed individuals and other significant events, as such information becomes available;

25. *Directs* the Committee to conduct a review of all names on the Consolidated List at the date of adoption of this resolution by 30 June 2010 in which the relevant names are circulated to the designating states and states of residence and/or citizenship, where known, pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Committee guidelines, in order to ensure the Consolidated List is as updated and accurate as possible and to confirm that listing remains appropriate;

26. *Further directs* the Committee, upon completion of the review described in paragraph 25 above, to conduct an annual review of all names on the Consolidated List that have not been reviewed in three or more years, in which the relevant names are circulated to the designating states and states of residence and/or citizenship, where known, pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Committee

guidelines, in order to ensure the Consolidated List is as updated and accurate as possible and to confirm that listing remains appropriate;

Measures implementation

27. *Reiterates* the importance of all States identifying, and if necessary introducing, adequate procedures to implement fully all aspects of the measures described in paragraph 1 above;

28. *Encourages* the Committee to continue to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on the Consolidated List and for removing them as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions, and directs the Committee to keep its guidelines under active review in support of these objectives;

29. *Directs* the Committee, as a matter of priority, to review its guidelines with respect to the provisions of this resolution, in particular paragraphs 6, 12, 13, 17, 22, and 26 above;

30. *Encourages* Member States to send representatives to meet the Committee for more in-depth discussion of relevant issues and welcomes voluntary briefings from interested Member States on their efforts to implement the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above, including particular challenges that hinder full implementation of the measures;

31. *Requests* the Committee to report to the Council on its findings regarding Member States' implementation efforts, and identify and recommend steps necessary to improve implementation;

32. *Directs* the Committee to identify possible cases of non-compliance with the measures pursuant to paragraph 1 above and to determine the appropriate course of action on each case, and *requests* the Chairman, in periodic reports to the Council pursuant to paragraph 38 below, to provide progress reports on the Committee's work on this issue;

33. *Urges* all Member States, in their implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 1 above, to ensure that fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen, and lost passports and other travel documents are invalidated and removed from circulation, in accordance with domestic laws and practices, as soon as possible, and to share information on those documents with other Member States through the INTERPOL database;

34. *Encourages* Member States to share, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, with the private sector information in their national databases related to fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen, and lost identity or travel documents pertaining to their own jurisdictions, and, if a listed party is found to be using a false identity including to secure credit or fraudulent travel documents, to provide the Committee with information in this regard;

Coordination and outreach

35. *Reiterates* the need to enhance ongoing cooperation among the Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), as well as their respective groups of experts, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information-sharing, coordination on visits to countries within their respective mandates, on technical

assistance, on relations with international and regional organizations and agencies and on other issues of relevance to all three committees, and *expresses its intention* to provide guidance to the committees on areas of common interest in order better to coordinate their efforts;

36. *Encourages* the Monitoring Team, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to continue their joint activities, in cooperation with CTED and 1540 Committee experts to assist Member States in their efforts to comply with their obligations under the relevant resolutions, including through organizing subregional workshops;

37. *Requests* the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chairman and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above, with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with this resolution and resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), and 1735 (2006);

38. *Requests* the Committee to report orally, through its Chairman, at least every 180 days to the Council on the overall work of the Committee and the Monitoring Team, and, as appropriate, in conjunction with the reports by the Chairmen of the CTC and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), including briefings for all interested Member States;

Monitoring Team

39. *Decides*, in order to assist the Committee in the fulfilment of its mandate, to extend the mandate of the current New York-based Monitoring Team, appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution 1617 (2005), for a further period of 18 months, under the direction of the Committee with the responsibilities outlined in Annex 1, and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect;

Reviews

40. *Decides* to review the measures described in paragraph 1 above with a view to their possible further strengthening in 18 months, or sooner if necessary;

41. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I

In accordance with paragraph 39 of this resolution, the Monitoring Team shall operate under the direction of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and shall have the following responsibilities:

(a) To submit, in writing, two comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee, one by 28 February 2009 and the second by 31 July 2009, on implementation by States of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, including specific recommendations for improved implementation of the measures and possible new measures;

(b) To analyse reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1455 (2003), the checklists submitted pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1617 (2005), and other information submitted by Member States to the Committee as instructed by the Committee;

(c) To assist the Committee in following up on requests to Member States for information, including with respect to implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;

(d) To submit a comprehensive programme of work to the Committee for its review and approval, as necessary, in which the Monitoring Team should detail the activities, envisaged in order to fulfil its responsibilities, including proposed travel, based on close coordination with the CTC's Executive Directorate ("CTED") and the 1540 Committee's group of experts to avoid duplication and reinforce synergies;

(e) To work closely and share information with CTED and the 1540 Committee's group of experts to identify areas of convergence and overlap and to help facilitate concrete coordination, including in the area of reporting, among the three Committees;

(f) To participate actively in and support all relevant activities under the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy including within the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force established to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system;

(g) To assist the Committee with its analysis of non-compliance with the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution by collating information collected from Member States and submitting case studies, both on its own initiative and upon the Committee's request, to the Committee for its review;

(h) To present to the Committee recommendations, which could be used by member States to assist them with the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution and in preparing proposed additions to the Consolidated List;

(i) To assist the Committee in compiling publicly releasable information referred to in paragraph 13;

(j) To consult with Member States in advance of travel to selected Member States, based on its programme of work as approved by the Committee;

(k) To encourage Member States to submit names and additional identifying information for inclusion on the Consolidated List, as instructed by the Committee;

(l) To present to the Committee additional identifying and other information to assist the Committee in its efforts to keep the Consolidated List as updated and accurate as possible;

(m) To study and report to the Committee on the changing nature of the threat of Al-Qaida and the Taliban and the best measures to confront it, including by developing a dialogue with relevant scholars and academic bodies, in consultation with the Committee;

(n) To collate, assess, monitor and report on and make recommendations regarding implementation of the measures, including implementation of the measure in paragraph 1(a) of this resolution as it pertains to preventing the criminal misuse of the Internet by Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them; to pursue case studies, as appropriate; and to explore in depth any other relevant issues as directed by the Committee;

(o) To consult with Member States and other relevant organizations, including regular dialogue with representatives in New York and in capitals, taking into account their comments, especially regarding any issues that might be contained in the Monitoring Team's reports referred to in paragraph (a) of this Annex;

(p) To consult with Member States' intelligence and security services, including through regional forums, in order to facilitate the sharing of information and to strengthen enforcement of the measures;

(q) To consult with relevant representatives of the private sector, including financial institutions, to learn about the practical implementation of the assets freeze and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of that measure;

(r) To work with relevant international and regional organizations in order to promote awareness of, and compliance with, the measures;

(s) To work with INTERPOL and Member States to obtain photographs of listed individuals for possible inclusion in INTERPOL Special Notices;

(t) To assist other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, and their expert panels, upon request with enhancing their cooperation with INTERPOL, referred to in resolution 1699 (2006);

(u) To report to the Committee, on a regular basis or when the Committee so requests, through oral and/or written briefings on the work of the Monitoring Team, including its visits to Member States and its activities;

(v) Any other responsibility identified by the Committee.

**Security Council**

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**Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation
of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)****I. Introduction**

1. The present report is the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). It provides a comprehensive assessment of the steps taken to implement resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report of the Secretary-General was issued on 28 February 2008 (S/2008/135) and highlights both the progress made in the implementation of the resolution and areas of concern that continue to impede the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution between the parties. The present report also proposes measures that could be undertaken by the parties in the coming months with a view to achieving a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the 2006 conflict.

2. I am pleased that all parties continue to express their commitment to the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). Nothing less than such a commitment to the principles and the concrete provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), accompanied by concrete steps towards achieving the goals set by the resolution, could lead to the achievement of a permanent ceasefire and a lasting solution between Israel and Lebanon.

3. The reporting period was characterized for the most part by the continuation of the prolonged political crisis in Lebanon, which culminated early in May in an extremely serious deterioration of the domestic security situation. In protest of two Government decisions taken on 6 May 2008, Hizbullah and other opposition groups took control of and closed roads leading to Beirut International Airport as well as other key roads in parts of the capital. In response, pro-Government groups closed the main border crossing between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Those actions brought the country to a standstill. Armed clashes between opposition and pro-Government groups, which on occasion included the use of heavy weapons, spread rapidly in several parts of the country. During the clashes that occurred from 8 to 13 May 2008, 69 people died, including a number of civilians, and more than 180 were injured.

4. Following the efforts of the League of Arab States and the crucial mediation role played by the Government of Qatar, Lebanon started to emerge from the political crisis that had paralysed the normal functioning of State institutions for the past year and a half. The Doha agreement reached on 21 May 2008 established the



basis for resolving the long-standing dispute regarding power-sharing arrangements between the majority and the opposition in a Government of national unity and included an understanding on electoral issues relating to the 2009 parliamentary elections. In addition, the agreement included a commitment from all sides to refrain from the use of weapons or violence to achieve political gains. It also provided for the launching of a dialogue on the reinforcement of the authority of the State of Lebanon over its territory. Following the Doha agreement, President Sleiman was elected on 25 May 2008, six months after the office had become vacant. Negotiations for the formation of a new national unity Government are ongoing.

5. There were no breaches of the cessation of hostilities, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) continued its activities with the parties to ensure full respect for the Blue Line. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces have continued their efforts to ensure that the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River is not utilized for hostile activities and is free of any unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons. Cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces has continued to be good.

II. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

6. The military and security situation in the UNIFIL area of operations remained generally quiet. The parties reiterated their commitment to uphold the cessation of hostilities. While the clashes in Beirut and other areas of the country early in May did not spread to the UNIFIL area of operations, political instability in the country resulted in increased volatility in the area. There were also a number of incidents during the reporting period, on occasion raising tensions in the area of operations. Some of those incidents, in particular that of 31 March 2008, during which armed elements blocked a UNIFIL patrol, constituted violations of resolution 1701 (2006) and served to undermine UNIFIL efforts to build trust and confidence between the parties and with the population of southern Lebanon.

A. Respect for the Blue Line

7. The parties continued to generally respect the Blue Line. Besides the unchanged situation in the village of Ghajar and the small adjacent area north of the Blue Line, a few ground violations were reported, especially in the area of the Shab'a Farms, where the Blue Line is neither visibly marked nor easily recognizable on the ground. The Lebanese Armed Forces alleged that a group of Israel Defense Forces soldiers had violated the Blue Line on 13 April 2008 near United Nations position 4-7C in the Shab'a Farms area. On 13 May 2008, the Israel Defense Forces apprehended and temporarily detained a Lebanese shepherd who the Israel Defense Forces alleged had crossed the Blue Line in the same area. UNIFIL investigations into both incidents were not able to confirm or refute the allegations. In response, UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, established additional observation posts in the area. UNIFIL also reported a number of minor ground violations by local Lebanese shepherds. As noted in my previous reports, such violations, which in some cases may be inadvertent, could lead to unintentional incidents and an unintended escalation of tension. UNIFIL protested all violations

and explored, in bilateral discussions and in the tripartite forum, ways of preventing further ones.

8. There has been some progress made with respect to the pilot project of visibly marking a 6-kilometre stretch of the Blue Line, which UNIFIL is carrying out jointly with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces. Since my last report, an additional seven Blue Line barrels have been positioned, verified and confirmed by the two parties, bringing the total number of barrels in place to nine. To build on that progress, and upon the request of the parties, UNIFIL is discussing, at the bilateral level, the issue of the extension of the pilot project to other areas. However, I am concerned that the process is beginning to slow down, and I urge the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces to remain focused on a practical and constructive approach in this endeavour and to continue their cooperation with UNIFIL. I reiterate the importance of visibly marking the Blue Line in order to reduce the number of inadvertent violations on the ground and to build confidence.

9. The pumping by Israel of accumulated flood water from Israeli to Lebanese territory in the vicinity of the town of Kafr Kila, located in close proximity to the Blue Line in the UNIFIL eastern sector, prompted a number of small demonstrations by affected Lebanese farmers. UNIFIL defused tensions by pumping the water into water trucks for dispersal elsewhere. Following discussions at the bilateral level and in the tripartite forum, UNIFIL submitted a proposal to the parties concerning measures aimed at preventing this problem from recurring at the time of the next seasonal rains. The Lebanese side has agreed to the proposal, while a response from the Israeli side is pending.

10. During the reporting period, UNIFIL recorded and protested an unprecedented number of violations by Israel of Lebanese airspace by aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. Those violations occurred almost daily, at an average rate of more than 20 violations per day in March and April. On 16 April 2008 alone, UNIFIL recorded 72 violations by unmanned aerial vehicles. The number of air violations in May and June decreased, but remained at levels higher than had been recorded prior to February 2008.

11. The Government of Lebanon continues to protest the overflights by Israel as serious violations of the sovereignty of Lebanon and of resolution 1701 (2006). The Government of Israel maintains that they are necessary security measures that will continue until its two abducted soldiers are released and the measures set out in paragraphs 14 and 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) are implemented in full. All overflights by Israel of Lebanese territory constitute violations of Lebanese sovereignty and of resolution 1701 (2006).

12. No new information has come to light as a result of the investigations into the two rocket attacks against Israel of 17 June 2007 and 8 January 2008. I reiterate my call on the authorities of Lebanon to continue their efforts to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

13. The regular tripartite meetings with senior representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, chaired by the UNIFIL Force

Commander, continued to be an essential confidence-building mechanism between the parties. The two sides demonstrate a strong commitment to that forum, which aims to enhance liaison and coordination and to address key security and military operational issues, including violations of resolution 1701 (2006) and the findings of UNIFIL investigations into incidents.

14. The Israel Defense Forces remained in control of part of the village of Ghajar and a small adjacent area north of the Blue Line. Hence, Israel has not completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon in accordance with its obligations under resolution 1701 (2006). This is a continuous source of tension, which could easily escalate. In an effort to break the impasse and facilitate the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces, UNIFIL submitted a new proposal to the parties and is awaiting their response.

15. Following the shooting incidents that occurred in November 2007 and February 2008 in the vicinity of Ghajar, which were detailed in my previous report, UNIFIL implemented a series of security measures to prevent violations of the Blue Line and smuggling activities, in accordance with an agreement reached with the parties during the April tripartite meeting. Those measures included the laying of concertina wire and better lighting of the northern and western approaches to the village, as well as the clearing of a patrol path on the western perimeter up to the Blue Line. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces also intensified patrolling in the area. Since mid-May, UNIFIL has been conducting two daily foot patrols along the western patrol path leading to the Blue Line in the area under the control of the Israel Defense Forces.

16. The UNIFIL area of operations is effectively controlled by the combined presence of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which contributes to greater peace and stability in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL currently maintains 64 permanent positions and 136 observation posts. UNIFIL troops conduct almost 400 vehicle, foot and air patrols, day and night, during each 24-hour period throughout the area of operations, in both rural and urban areas. The Lebanese Armed Forces remains deployed in the area of operations, with four brigades of different sizes, and continues to operate an average of 115 checkpoints and observation posts, as well as 26 patrols per day. In addition, joint training exercises and coordinated activities with UNIFIL have continued, with a view to enhancing the operational capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces. During the armed clashes in Beirut and other parts of the country early in May, the Lebanese Armed Forces redeployed a number of units out of the UNIFIL area of operations to fulfil its security obligations elsewhere. While the Lebanese Armed Forces continued to carry out its responsibilities in accordance with resolution 1701 (2006), the redeployment of its units away from the UNIFIL area of operations for prolonged periods could have an impact on its coordinated operational activities with UNIFIL and their overall operational tempo. The competing security responsibilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, compounded by the fact that it lacks adequate military equipment, limit its military readiness.

17. In April, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted the first session of a strategic review of the military tasks carried out by the two Forces as part of the ongoing efforts to further develop and strengthen coordination and liaison procedures. Agreement was reached on a number of concrete measures: to increase the number of daily counter-rocket-launching operations and expand their coverage from areas adjacent to the Blue Line to other parts of the area of operations; to

enhance efforts to deter and prevent hunting activities in the area of operations; to intensify surveillance in areas near the Blue Line; and to operate co-located checkpoints and increase the number of vehicle checks. In addition, it was agreed that liaison and interaction at the operational and tactical levels should be improved.

18. As a result, since the beginning of May, coordinated operations between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces have increased in frequency and complexity. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces operate daily six co-located checkpoints that are in proximity to one another on the Litani River, in addition to two such checkpoints elsewhere in the area of operations and four coordinated foot patrols along the Blue Line. Moreover, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces conduct 10 counter-rocket-launching operations every day during which troops patrol a selected area by vehicle and on foot and establish temporary observation posts and checkpoints to stop and check vehicles and persons moving in the area. A follow-up session of the strategic review took place in the first half of June.

19. Ensuring that the area south of the Litani River is free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons, as stipulated in resolution 1701 (2006) and pursuant to the decisions taken in July and August 2006 by the Cabinet of Lebanon, is a vital element of the security arrangements. Since my previous report, coordinated operations undertaken by UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces have resulted in the discovery of 92 items, including abandoned arms, ammunition and explosive devices. Among those were two rockets, 25 artillery shells and 26 mortar rounds, in addition to six former armed-element facilities, one of which was protected by a booby trap. There were no signs that the installations had been used recently. All of the equipment, arms and ammunition discovered were from the period of the 2006 conflict or before. The Lebanese Armed Forces has confirmed that it destroys or confiscates all arms and ammunition found south of the Litani River.

20. Israel maintains that Hizbullah is continuing to build its military presence and capacity, largely north of the Litani River but also in the UNIFIL area of operations, in both open and urban areas, including in private houses. UNIFIL, in collaboration with the Lebanese Armed Forces, immediately investigates any claims of alleged violations of resolution 1701 (2006) within its area of operations if specific information and evidence is received. To date, it has found no evidence of new military infrastructure in the area of operations. However, UNIFIL did encounter unauthorized armed personnel on one occasion during the night of 30 to 31 March 2008, in an incident described in paragraph 21 below. In addition, past attacks on UNIFIL and rocket attacks against Israel have demonstrated that there are unauthorized arms and hostile groups prepared to use them, including within the UNIFIL area of operations.

21. During the reporting period, several incidents highlighted the challenges that UNIFIL faces in fulfilling its mandated activities. During the night of 30 to 31 March, a UNIFIL patrol observed a truck towing a trailer, which it considered suspicious, near the village of Jibal al-Butm, in the UNIFIL western sector. As the patrol turned around and started to follow the truck, two cars with five armed elements arrived at the scene and blocked the road. The patrol challenged the armed elements, who did not respond. The armed elements left the area after approximately three minutes. Meanwhile, the truck and the trailer moved on and could not later be located. The Lebanese Armed Forces was notified and arrived quickly at the location. An investigation was launched immediately, and UNIFIL and Lebanese

Armed Forces patrols combed the area. However, efforts to locate or identify the perpetrators were unsuccessful. The presence of armed elements in the UNIFIL area of operations is a flagrant and serious violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The incident also constitutes an obstruction of the Force's freedom of movement.

22. Following the incident, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces further intensified their coordinated activities and increased the number of checkpoints so as to enhance overall security control in the area of operations. As a result, 25 old inert shells were discovered in a civilian vehicle at a UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces checkpoint near Kafr Shuba on 15 April. The two occupants of the vehicle were arrested by the Lebanese Armed Forces and are still under investigation.

23. On 12 May 2008, another serious incident occurred in the vicinity of Adchit al-Qusair, in the eastern sector of the area of operations, where a UNIFIL patrol had photographed cables that were being laid in the ground that appeared to be suspicious. In response, civilians at the site photographed and threw stones at the UNIFIL patrol and impeded its freedom of movement by blocking the road with two vehicles. The situation was complicated by language barriers between the UNIFIL patrol, Lebanese Armed Forces personnel and local civilians. However, the situation improved when all the parties agreed to discard all photographs taken at the scene. Several armed Lebanese security personnel in civilian clothes arrived later.

24. The incident also serves as an example of the challenges UNIFIL sometimes faces in carrying out its operational activities. As has been reported previously, its operational activities are on occasion closely monitored by unarmed civilians. In addition, its use of photographic and recording devices in the area of operations remains an extremely sensitive issue, even though the Force ensures that audio/video recording and photography are carried out in full compliance with United Nations policy, which authorizes the use of photographic and other electronic devices in the accomplishment of mandated tasks. UNIFIL is increasing awareness of that policy among the Lebanese Armed Forces and the local population.

25. A third incident, on 10 May 2008, involved a UNIFIL peacekeeper serving with the Nepalese contingent who was slightly injured by a stray bullet that entered through the roof of his accommodation at United Nations position 8-30, north of the town of Meis al-Jabal, in the eastern sector of the UNIFIL area of operations. A UNIFIL investigation found that several rounds had hit the compound, possibly fired in the air by mourners attending the funeral of a member of the Lebanese security forces. UNIFIL reiterated to the Lebanese Armed Forces the need to make every effort to prevent such firing of weapons in future.

26. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continues to perform maritime interdiction operations along the Lebanese coast to prevent the entry of unauthorized arms and related materiel. Since the Task Force assumed its mission in mid-October 2006, more than 15,600 ships have been hailed and queried. Over 100 vessels were identified as suspicious, but subsequently were inspected and cleared by Lebanese naval or customs officials. There are Lebanese naval liaison officers on board the ship commanding the maritime interdiction operations as well as at UNIFIL headquarters. On 17 March 2008, the Maritime Task Force electronically detected a vessel entering the UNIFIL area of maritime operations from Israeli waters without having followed proper procedure, briefly violating Lebanese territorial waters south of Naqura. In response to queries, the Israel Defense Forces stated that no

Israeli navy vessel had entered Lebanese territorial waters. On 22 and 23 May, the Lebanese Armed Forces protested the alleged hailing by the Israel Defense Forces navy of two ships in Lebanese territorial waters. The Israel Defense Forces acknowledged hailing, on 22 May, a passenger vessel coming from Larnaca, Cyprus, and heading to Naqura that was being utilized for UNIFIL troop rotation. UNIFIL was not in a position to ascertain the facts concerning the second alleged hailing, on 23 May 2008. Such hailing of vessels in Lebanese territorial waters contravenes the liaison and coordination arrangements agreed between the parties and UNIFIL and undermines the mission of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force.

27. The joint training programme between the UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces maritime forces continued. Following completion of the establishment of the Coastal Radar Organization, training efforts are now focused on improving the operational integration of Lebanese navy units with the Coastal Radar Organization and the capabilities of Lebanese navy personnel in such areas as boarding and surface surveillance, in addition to tactical exercises. It remains of critical importance that the intensive training programme for Lebanese navy personnel be complemented by continued material and technical support over the medium to long term so as to enable the Lebanese navy to assume responsibilities and tasks presently performed by the Maritime Task Force. I am grateful to the Government of Germany for having donated one naval vessel, the third in total, to the Lebanese navy. The donation of that former German navy patrol boat represents a significant enhancement of the naval equipment of Lebanon.

28. Coordination and liaison with the Israel Defense Forces remained good and efficient. UNIFIL maintains a liaison office with two officers at the Israel Defense Forces Northern Command headquarters in Zefat. Preparations for the establishment of the Tel Aviv office have reached an advanced stage. Under the direct command of the Force Commander, the office will be an essential and integral part of the Force's coordination and liaison with the Israel Defense Forces, focusing at the strategic headquarters level, with a view to advancing the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). Current discussions centre on the final modalities and technical aspects of the office and are expected to be concluded soon. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is in the process of identifying a candidate, at the rank of Brigadier-General, to head the office.

29. UNIFIL maintained close relations with the local communities and, with some exceptions as noted above, the population's attitude towards the Force remained generally positive throughout the reporting period. UNIFIL continued its humanitarian assistance activities, including medical and dental services, veterinary assistance and small-scale engineering support to improve the local communities' infrastructure, as well as the identification and disposal of unexploded ordnance. The UNIFIL civil-military cooperation and civil affairs components continued to implement quick-impact projects for the benefit of local communities, funded by troop-contributing countries and from the Force's budget. Such projects remain essential for UNIFIL to build confidence and support among the local population. Importantly, the Force also launched its community outreach programme, which is aimed at increasing the local population's understanding of the UNIFIL mandate and at responding to its concerns.

C. Disarming armed groups

30. The Government of Israel has reiterated its position concerning Hizbullah armament, military presence and capacity north of the Litani River, as detailed in my previous report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2008/135). It has also reiterated its assertions regarding the sources of the transfer of such weapons.

31. The violence that engulfed Lebanon early in May demonstrated yet again the serious threat that armed groups outside of the control of the State pose to the stability of Lebanon. Hizbullah and other groups engaged in heavy clashes in many regions throughout the country, resulting in loss of life, injuries, damage to property and general instability. Those events were a stark reminder of the urgency and importance of ensuring that there are no weapons in the country without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon.

32. As I have indicated in previous reports, I continue to believe that the disarmament of Hizbullah and other militias should take place through a Lebanese-led political process. I am encouraged that in Doha Lebanese leaders provided for the launching of a dialogue to promote the State's authority over all Lebanese territory and its relationship with the various groups in Lebanon in order to ensure the security of the State and of its citizens. The leaders agreed to prohibit the use of weapons or violence in any internal conflict that may arise, to implement the law and to uphold the sovereignty of the State throughout Lebanon. The leaders committed themselves to pursuing the dialogue under the auspices of the President once the Government is established and with the participation of the Arab League, in a way that would reinforce trust among the Lebanese people.

33. Another serious threat to the stability and sovereignty of Lebanon is posed by non-Lebanese armed groups. In my previous report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) (S/2008/264), I highlighted the threat posed by Palestinian and other armed groups inside and outside the 12 officially registered refugee camps. During the reporting period, there were several incidents in or around Palestinian camps, in particular in and around the Ein el-Hilweh camp in Sidon, around the Nahr al-Bared camp in northern Lebanon, as well as near the city of Tripoli in the north. Seven people were killed and 26 injured as a result. In one of those incidents, which occurred on 31 May 2008 near the entrance of Nahr al-Bared, a Lebanese Armed Forces outpost was targeted by an explosion that killed one soldier.

D. Arms embargo

34. In my previous report to the Council, and in accordance with the request of the Council contained in its presidential statement of 3 August 2007 (S/PRST/2007/29), I indicated my intention to dispatch to Lebanon a team of experts to carry out a detailed assessment of the implementation of the recommendations of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team. Due to the deterioration of the security situation in Lebanon early in May and the resignation of the Government of Lebanon later that month, it was not possible to dispatch the team during the reporting period. Preparations are under way for the team to travel to Lebanon as

soon as possible. A detailed report to the Security Council of the team's findings will follow in due course.

35. Since I last reported on this issue, there has been no significant change in the border security arrangements along the eastern frontier of Lebanon with the Syrian Arab Republic. While the Government of Lebanon has sought to upgrade certain security arrangements, the potential remains for breaches of the arms embargo under resolution 1701 (2006). That is due to the general porosity that continues to prevail along most of the border.

36. The Government of Lebanon has maintained the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces along the border. However, the significant deterioration in the security situation throughout Lebanon during the reporting period continued to place great demands on the army in terms of operational requirements and human resources. During the events of early May 2008, several units from the eastern border were redeployed to meet security challenges in other parts of the country. Support has continued from the Internal Security Forces to compensate for the redeployment.

37. There has been no change regarding the continued presence of the heavily armed positions belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada that straddle the border. As noted in my previous reports, that anomaly effectively gives such groups, which operate outside the authority of the State of Lebanon, practical control of that part of the border. The Lebanese Armed Forces maintains its defensive encirclement of those positions on the Lebanese side of the frontier in order to reduce the potential threat that the situation poses to the security and stability of the State of Lebanon.

38. The Government of Lebanon has continued its efforts to enhance its border-management capacity. In that regard, and with international support, the Lebanese authorities have continued to work towards the implementation of some of the recommendations of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team.

39. The Lebanese Common Border Force, deployed along the northern border of Lebanon with the Syrian Arab Republic in the context of the German-led pilot project, operates a regular rotation of joint patrols, mobile and fixed checkpoints and observation points throughout its area of operations. The force has continued to build its capacity and cohesion through an ongoing training programme that has allowed it to become more independent in key aspects of its operational work.

40. During the reporting period, the Lebanese Common Border Force uncovered numerous cases of smuggling, mostly involving fuel and other consumer products. No incidents of weapons smuggling were observed. The force has taken measures to close the illegal routes used by smugglers and is working to enhance facilities and procedures at the official crossing points. In that regard, I welcome the completion of the relocation of the crossing point at Aboudieh to the banks of the Nahr el-Kabir River, in line with a key recommendation of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team. However, owing to the prevailing political and security situation in the country during the reporting period, there has been little progress in the continued integration of the principal security services of Lebanon in the context of the Common Border Force.

41. The Lebanese authorities, with support from international donors, have also worked to improve the capacity of Lebanon to control its borders in other areas

through new initiatives. A comprehensive project is being launched at Beirut International Airport, including a new joint operations room, a multi-agency training component and explosive-disposal, canine and naval security units. Other ongoing initiatives include the delivery of additional scanners to be used by Lebanese customs and the installation of a new facility operated by General Security to detect forged documents. The Lebanese customs authorities also undertook a recruitment drive aimed at increasing the number of qualified personnel as part of their objective of ensuring more effective control and monitoring mechanisms.

42. Lebanon has emphasized the need to establish cooperation on border management with Syrian counterparts. The Syrian Arab Republic, in a letter dated 6 March 2008 (A/62/725-S/2008/164), written in response to my sixth report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2008/135), denied that there had been arms smuggling from its territory. It also reconfirmed the information contained in paragraph 49 of that report regarding the number of border guards on the Syrian side, requests for technical equipment for Syrian personnel and the number of meetings between Lebanese and Syrian officials during the period from 2005 to 2007. Cooperation between the two countries on border control issues is essential to achieving good border management that benefits both countries. I call on both neighbours to work together towards this shared goal.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

43. During the period from the end of the 2006 conflict through 19 June 2008, incidents involving unexploded ordnance, including cluster munitions, led to 27 civilian fatalities and 231 civilian injuries. Mine-clearance incidents have resulted in 13 mine-clearance fatalities and 38 injuries thus far.

44. The United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre — South Lebanon has coordinated the clearance and reduction of approximately 36.6 million m² of contaminated land, comprising 49 per cent of the surface and 29 per cent of the sub-surface areas, through a joint effort including the Lebanese Armed Forces, the United Nations, bilaterally funded clearance organizations and UNIFIL. In total, 145,580 cluster munitions have been located and destroyed. When operational planning began after the war, the size of the affected area was estimated at some 32 million m², but has now increased to 39.4 million m². Since my previous report, the Mine Action Coordination Centre has identified 21 additional cluster-bomb strike locations, bringing the total to 984 locations recorded thus far.

45. During the reporting period, there was no progress in terms of receiving from Israel precise technical strike data on the number, type and location of munitions fired during the 2006 conflict. In the absence of such technical strike data from Israel, the level of contamination remained uncertain. Efforts by the United Nations, both at Headquarters and in the field, to secure technical strike data regarding cluster munitions have persisted. This issue has been raised in the tripartite forum and bilaterally on a number of occasions by the UNIFIL Force Commander.

F. Abducted soldiers and prisoners

46. My facilitator is continuing to work on the negotiations related to the issue of the abducted Israeli soldiers and the Lebanese prisoners in Israel. Owing to the sensitivity of those negotiations, I am unable to report on this issue at this time.

G. Delineation of borders

47. Since my previous report, there has been no progress on the issue of Lebanese border delineation pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006). In its letter of 6 March 2008 (S/2008/164), the Syrian Arab Republic again stated that border demarcation was a bilateral matter pertaining to State sovereignty that should be resolved by the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. In the letter, the Syrian Arab Republic also reiterated that it was prepared to begin demarcating the Syrian-Lebanese border, starting from the north for reasons of practical necessity because the southern part of the common border, including the Shab'a Farms, is under Israeli occupation. No concrete steps have been taken to start a process to demarcate the Syrian-Lebanese border in the north.

48. Following the Doha agreement, President Al-Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic made statements regarding the possible establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and his country. That would constitute tangible and significant progress towards the formalization of relations between the two neighbouring countries and towards reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon.

49. On the issue of the Shab'a Farms, I received a letter dated 2 April 2008 from Prime Minister Siniora welcoming the completion of the cartographic work on the geographical definition of the area referred to as the Shab'a Farms. The Prime Minister considered that the provisional definition contained in my report (S/2007/641) of 30 October 2007 provided a reasonable and practical basis for removing one of the obstacles standing in the way of the establishment of a permanent ceasefire in accordance with resolution 1701 (2006). I have not received any official responses to the provisional definition from the Syrian Arab Republic or Israel, despite my request. Nor have I received any response to my repeated requests for documents from the Syrian Arab Republic.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

50. In the face of threats from some militant and extremist groups, including Al-Qaida, the security and safety of UNIFIL personnel remains a matter of particular concern. Notwithstanding the obligation of all parties to ensure the safety and security of UNIFIL and the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon for law and order, the Force continues to focus on mitigating risks to its personnel, assets and installations through infrastructure enhancement projects, information-gathering and analysis, as well as the ongoing acquisition of electronic countermeasures to jam explosive devices and micro-unmanned aerial vehicles. The unmanned aerial vehicles are to be utilized at the discretion of the Force Commander and represent a critical additional risk-mitigating asset to enhance

Force protection and civilian staff security. In accordance with the plans outlined in my previous report to increase the Force's intelligence capabilities, a Joint Mission Analysis Centre has been established that once fully staffed, will be able to enhance the Force's information analysis capacity.

51. In addition, UNIFIL continued to implement security enhancements throughout its area of operations through the construction of reinforced perimeter structures, permanent observation towers and underground reinforced shelters, as well as the replacement of temporary water and sanitation infrastructure in military positions.

52. Investigations continue into the 24 June 2007 attack against UNIFIL, which killed six peacekeepers serving with the Spanish contingent. The Governments of Lebanon and Spain have agreed to form a joint investigation team, which is expected to begin work shortly. UNIFIL will provide assistance to the team and looks forward to continuing to work with all parties to achieve progress in the investigation. The Lebanese authorities are continuing their investigations into two other attacks against UNIFIL, namely, the 16 July 2007 attack against a UNIFIL military police vehicle from the Tanzanian contingent and the 8 January 2008 attack against a vehicle north of Sidon that injured two Irish peacekeepers. Regarding the 16 July attack, a suspect — accused of activating the remote-controlled improvised explosive device involved — is under arrest. He reportedly confessed to the crime and is expected to go on trial later this year. Several other suspects in this attack remain at large. Regarding the 8 January attack, the Lebanese authorities have arrested two suspects from the Ein el-Hilweh refugee camp; however, both deny involvement in the crime. The authorities are still searching for a third suspect. The perpetrators of those attacks on UNIFIL must be identified and brought to justice.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

53. As at 31 May 2008, the total military strength of UNIFIL was 12,400 personnel, with a civilian strength of 317 international and 619 national staff members. On 16 May 2008, a UNIFIL armoured personnel carrier carrying Malaysian soldiers overturned in the vicinity of the town of Srifa in the western sector of the UNIFIL area of operations. One peacekeeper died and five others were wounded, four of them seriously. On 15 June 2008, a UNIFIL armoured personnel carrier carrying Spanish soldiers overturned near the UNIFIL Sector East headquarters in Marjayoun. One peacekeeper died and two others were slightly injured.

54. UNIFIL is currently supported by 52 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization military observers of the Observer Group Lebanon. While the number of observers and their mission remain unchanged, the patrol teams have moved from their three existing patrol bases and are now co-located in two UNIFIL positions, one in Sector East and the other in Sector West, providing for enhanced liaison, security and logistics. The former patrol bases are now used by UNIFIL as permanent observation posts.

55. I am grateful that, following the withdrawal of contingents from Finland, Ireland and Qatar, as noted in my previous report, Indonesia and Malaysia have

agreed to supplement their current contributions to the Force. Indonesia has pledged to deploy a Force protection company to secure the expanded Naqura headquarters compound as well as additional personnel within the Force headquarters support company and international military police. Meanwhile, Malaysia, in addition to being assigned its own area of responsibility for its current contribution, has pledged to deploy an additional infantry company elsewhere in the area of operations.

56. While a limited number of military community outreach units and civil-military coordination military personnel have deployed to the mission, I would like to emphasize the need for additional deployments in order to further enhance critical relations with local communities. A major construction project is being undertaken at Naqura headquarters to cater to the expanded mission's work and living accommodation needs and to make UNIFIL compliant with United Nations security recommendations.

57. At the end of February 2008, Germany handed over leadership of the Maritime Task Force to the European Maritime Force, a European naval initiative of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, currently under the command of Italy. The Maritime Task Force currently comprises four frigates, eight patrol boats and one auxiliary supply ship. On the basis of a recent ship-to-task analysis and with flexible tasking of existing assets, the present Force composition is sufficient to fulfil the mission.

58. In line with the second comprehensive review of the Strategic Military Cell, and taking into consideration the decision of the General Assembly in its resolution 62/265, the Strategic Military Cell will undergo a phased downsizing aimed at the full integration of its functions within the reinforced Office of Military Affairs of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

V. Observations

59. The violence that engulfed Lebanon early in May threatened to lead to a full-scale sectarian conflict that could have had consequences beyond the country's borders. With the Doha agreement, there are new opportunities for the Lebanese people to consolidate the country's political stability and create an environment conducive to further addressing the critical challenges facing the country. I look forward to the speedy establishment of a national unity Government and to the revitalization of the constitutional institutions of Lebanon, which I believe will help the country make further concrete progress on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

60. While I am mindful of the fact that the violence of May was exacerbated by the prolonged political crisis, the events witnessed during that period illustrated starkly the risks to the foundation of the State of Lebanon posed by the actions of non-State actors. The presence of both Lebanese and non-Lebanese armed groups outside the control of the Government undermines the consolidation of the authority and stability of the Lebanese State and is incompatible with that objective. Therefore, I welcome and strongly encourage the dialogue that the leaders of Lebanon have committed themselves to pursuing on the reinforcement of the authority of the State over its territory and its relations with such groups. Furthermore, I note positively the commitment of President Sleiman to leading a

national process to address this issue, which remains a key aspect of resolution 1701 (2006).

61. The emergence of several positive indicators in the region may also offer the opportunity for further progress on the implementation of key aspects of resolution 1701 (2006). I am encouraged by the various signals from President Al-Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the establishment of diplomatic ties between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon, in keeping with the provisions of resolution 1680 (2006). Furthermore, I urge both parties to capitalize on this potential momentum and to work together towards the delineation of their common border in accordance with resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1680 (2006). It is my belief that the establishment of diplomatic relations and common border delineation will be of mutual benefit for Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and is important for addressing a number of key elements of resolution 1701 (2006).

62. I am encouraged by the renewed declarations from the international community on the importance of finding a solution to the issue of the Shab'a Farms area. I plan to strengthen the diplomatic process aimed at resolving this key issue in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006). I will also continue my efforts to investigate the implications of the interim proposal contained in the seven-point plan of the Government of Lebanon, and I will continue my consultations with all relevant parties and keep the Council informed. Progress on this cannot be separated from the principles and elements required for the permanent ceasefire and long-term solution identified in resolution 1701 (2006).

63. I believe also that we can make further progress on the issue of Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line. I call upon the Governments of Lebanon and Israel to reply positively to the letters sent by the UNIFIL Force Commander containing a proposal that would ensure the full withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from that area in accordance with resolution 1701 (2006), taking into consideration the legitimate humanitarian concerns of the local population.

64. I am pleased that the cessation of hostilities was adhered to during the reporting period. As a result, we have witnessed the longest period of relative stability in the area in many years. The efforts of the Lebanese Armed Forces and of UNIFIL continued towards the further stabilization of the situation in the area of operations.

65. However, the presence of unidentified armed elements in the UNIFIL area of operations, coupled with incidents of restriction of the Force's movement and the monitoring of its operations, are a source of serious concern. They raise tensions and cannot but cast doubt on the motives of those involved. I underline the importance of ensuring that the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River is free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons. I call on the Government of Lebanon to ensure the Force's full freedom of movement in its area of operations and reiterate my call on all parties to abide by their stated commitments to resolution 1701 (2006).

66. I remain concerned that the air violations by Israel not only continued unabated during the reporting period, but also reached record levels during the months of March and April 2008. I call on Israel to cease all overflights, as they are violations of resolution 1701 (2006) and cause tension among the local population, in addition to undermining the credibility of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces and their efforts to carry out their mandated activities.

67. I am grateful to all troop-contributing countries for their ongoing commitment to UNIFIL and to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). I emphasize once again the need for continued support for UNIFIL, including the commitment to contribute the troops and assets necessary to enable the Force to efficiently and effectively perform all of its mandated activities on land and at sea. I wish to strongly commend the UNIFIL Force Commander and the military and civilian peacekeeping personnel who continue to play a critical role in helping to promote peace and stability in southern Lebanon. At the same time, I remain concerned for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and urge all parties to abide by their obligation to ensure their safety and security.

68. The Lebanese Armed Forces is the Force's key partner in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). I am pleased with the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces and emphasize the need for such activities to increase in number and intensify in the future. However, the Lebanese Armed Forces will remain under considerable pressure in the carrying out of its heavy responsibilities, particularly in the aftermath of the May events and the continuing clashes in some parts of Lebanon. I reiterate that the support of the international community is vital to assist it in becoming an adequately equipped and capable force, able to assume effective security responsibility over the current area of operations of UNIFIL.

69. The full implementation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1701 (2006) is an indispensable and fundamental provision of the resolution. It must be observed immediately, comprehensively and without exception. Regional parties that maintain ties with Hizbullah and other groups in Lebanon are obliged to respect and abide fully by the arms embargo on Lebanon, violations of which constitute serious violations of Lebanese sovereignty and threaten to destabilize Lebanon and the region as a whole.

70. I welcome the determination of the Government of Lebanon to enhance its overall border-management capacity. I believe that a clearly defined Government strategy will be necessary to lay the foundations for an effective and increasingly integrated border-management system. The ongoing assistance of the international community will also be key, and I call on donors to ensure that they provide coherent and well-coordinated support for the Government of Lebanon in that regard.

71. I reiterate with urgency my call on the Government of Israel to provide detailed technical strike data on the type, quantity and specific coordinates of the sub-munitions fired during the 2006 conflict. That crucial information would greatly enhance the rate at which clearance operations are proceeding in southern Lebanon and reduce the number of incidents for both civilians and mine-clearance experts.

72. I remain concerned at the living conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and in particular by the conditions facing displaced Palestinians in the Nahr al-Bared camp and the Lebanese communities surrounding it. While some progress has been made towards addressing the immediate needs of the people affected by the 2007 conflict there, much work remains to be done, which will require the sustained support of Member States. In that regard, I would like to express my appreciation for the support extended by Member States at the international donor conference held in Vienna on 23 June for the reconstruction of the Nahr al-Bared camp, where an initial sum of \$112 million was pledged.

73. I would like to express my appreciation to those Member States that have provided, and continue to offer, financial and technical support to Lebanon. That country's efforts to move forward will require well-engineered and synchronized support on the part of the international community, on which I call to consider providing further assistance to Lebanon in its reconstruction and development efforts. I also urge all States to fulfil the pledges already made at the Paris III conference in 2007.

74. Overall, there are emerging possibilities for progress on key aspects of resolution 1701 (2006). I call upon the parties to seize the opportunities that may arise in order to generate further progress towards a lasting solution between Israel and Lebanon. The United Nations reiterates its commitment to supporting the parties in their efforts to that end.

75. It continues to be my profound conviction that we must exert all possible efforts to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East on the basis of the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which remains interdependent with the full territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon.

**Security Council**

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**Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Office for West Africa****I. Introduction**

1. In its letter dated 21 December 2007 (S/2007/754), the Security Council agreed to extend the mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) until 31 December 2010, and requested me to report on the fulfilment of its revised mandate every six months. The present report covers the period from 1 January to 30 June 2008, and addresses recommendations made in my report of 13 March 2007 to the Council on cross-border issues in West Africa (S/2007/143). It focuses on cross-cutting and cross-border developments in the subregion and activities undertaken by UNOWA in raising awareness of emerging threats and challenges, in promoting consultations and synergies at the subregional level, and in liaising with and assisting the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the promotion of peace and stability.

2. Significant progress has been made in West Africa in the consolidation of peace and democratic governance. Peaceful elections have been organized, international engagement in peacebuilding efforts has increased and, in testimony to strengthened national capacity for post-conflict reconstruction, United Nations peace missions in the subregion have begun to wind down, and two countries of the subregion, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, have been placed on the agenda of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Furthermore, ECOWAS is demonstrating increased capacity to tackle political, social, economic and security challenges in the subregion.

3. Despite these encouraging developments, many challenges remain that threaten to derail progress made in peace consolidation. Some of these threats are known, such as youth unemployment, rapid urbanization and irregular migration, while others are emerging or increasing in proportion, including social and economic crises, human and drug trafficking and insecurity in the Sahelian band.

4. As an indication of the importance I attach to West Africa and the commitment of the United Nations to continue to assist countries in the region build on progress made, I undertook a four-nation visit to Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Liberia from 19 to 23 April. The Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Haile Menkerios, also visited the subregion (Senegal, Burkina Faso, the Niger, Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Gambia) from 9 to 21 May, followed closely by my Special Adviser on conflict, Ian Egeland, who visited the Sahel



region (Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger) from 1 to 6 June. The aims of those three high-level missions were to assess and raise awareness of progress made and ongoing challenges facing the countries of the subregion, particularly with regard to current electoral processes, rising food prices and climate change.

II. Recent cross-cutting and cross-border developments

A. Destabilizing socio-economic issues

5. The socio-economic landscape of West Africa is quickly emerging as a growing threat to peace and security in the subregion, with extreme poverty and half its population living below the poverty line. While some countries have seen sustained economic growth in recent years, the uneven distribution of national income means that this growth has led more to inequality and increasing marginalization of segments of the population than to poverty reduction. The subregion also has the world's lowest human development indicators, severely impeding its achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

6. The West African annual population growth rate of 2.3 per cent is in marked contrast to the world average of 1.1 per cent, and the population in the subregion is expected to more than double by 2050. That projected growth would exacerbate continuing pressure on land and other resources and likely lead to greater social and political instability, further contributing to the rapid urbanization of cities and attendant social problems. Such unplanned and chaotic urbanization, which is common to most West African countries, may be a trigger for social instability and political unrest as urban centres struggle to cope with incoming masses. Urban dwellers, whose coping mechanisms are limited by their new environment, are increasingly vulnerable to contemporary socio-economic difficulties such as inflation and unemployment. Youth unemployment continues to be a pressing issue throughout the subregion, where up to 65 per cent of the approximately 270 million people are under 30 years of age and most are unemployed or underemployed. As experience in the subregion has shown, unemployed, frustrated and disillusioned youth are easy targets for criminal activity and recruitment into armed groups.

7. Seriously aggravating West Africa's economic plight is the soaring cost of fuel and basic goods, which has led to rising social tensions in recent months. Streets protests combining socio-economic and political grievances have affected countries such as Senegal, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and, most recently, Guinea. Urgent attention must be given to these socio-economic challenges to prevent them from further destabilizing the subregion.

B. Climate change and food security

8. West Africa is particularly vulnerable to and affected by climate change and disruptive weather patterns, including natural disasters, land degradation, desertification, water scarcity, droughts and floods. As cities become overcrowded, increasing pollution of the urban environment and toxic waste contribute to new environmental threats, sanitary hazards and other health problems. These conditions are likely to lead to decreasing economic and agricultural production in both rural and urban areas and increasing competition for scarce resources and viable land.

Weather forecasts predict a drier, harsher and more variable climate for the subregion in the coming decades, with greater water stress and susceptibility to extreme weather events. The severity of environmental problems facing West Africa must be given priority attention requiring the adoption and implementation of concerted policies at the subregional level.

9. The particular vulnerability of the subregion to rising food prices is linked to the fact that, as a result of low levels of productivity, inappropriate agricultural policies, rapid urbanization, natural disasters and conflicts, a large number of West Africa countries have become net importers of food. Although most Governments have taken palliative measures to mitigate the impact of soaring prices, many will be unable to cope in the medium and long term due to insufficient means and resources and inflation that, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is expected to rise further. In addition to grave humanitarian consequences, including mounting hunger and decreased expenditure on medical treatment, housing and education, the food crisis has become a serious security risk, as highlighted by the violent demonstrations, strikes and other manifestations of civil unrest reported above. If not effectively tackled, it could further destabilize countries that are already struggling to recover from conflict or experiencing political difficulties.

C. Governance

10. The West African subregion has seen significant progress in the area of good governance. After years of unrest and instability, democracy and peace are slowly but firmly taking root. However, persistent challenges remain that are threatening hard won progress, particularly in the areas of economic and resource management, electoral processes, human rights and security sector reform.

11. Establishing good governance practices remains a serious challenge in West Africa. Widespread corruption contributes to significantly weakening State institutions and the rule of law, upon which citizens rely for protection. In its worst form, rampant corruption leads to human rights abuses and the outbreak of conflict. In recent years, new corruption practices have flourished with the discovery of natural resources in the subregion, and transparent and accountable oversight of resource management is urgently needed if all segments of society are to reap the benefits of national wealth. Unless concrete measures are taken to curb corruption, progress achieved so far in establishing good governance will be undermined, with negative effects on peace and security.

12. While some elections in 2007 were marred by irregularities and, in certain cases, even violence, they also brought about a peaceful transition of power in countries such as Mauritania and Sierra Leone. In Togo, the electoral process paved the way for the country's emergence from decades of crisis and isolation. Despite the successes achieved to date, elections in West Africa remain potentially destabilizing processes that could threaten fragile countries with political violence, economic disruption and social strife. With important elections scheduled for 2008 in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, continuing efforts must be made to ensure credible electoral processes if the onset of violence and instability is to be avoided.

13. Human rights concerns remain another major challenge for West Africa. While the resolution of long-standing conflicts has put an end to mass human rights

violations, they continue on a smaller scale as a result largely of the prevailing culture of impunity. Abuses against women, as well as widespread disrespect for their political, social and economic rights, continued during the reporting period, exacerbated by harmful traditional, religious and customary practices. Strengthening of the rule of law, in particular judicial and security sector reform, is urgently needed if effective reconstruction and reconciliation is to be achieved in post-conflict societies. While the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms has borne some results, more work is needed to ensure accountability for past and ongoing human rights violations.

14. A key challenge for many post-conflict and transitional countries in the subregion is security sector reform. Despite efforts to improve management oversight of the security sector and restructure and train security forces and increased engagement of the international community, including the Peacebuilding Commission, security forces in a number of West African countries continue to be a major source of insecurity and aggravation for the population. Widespread bribery and extortion at illegal checkpoints and road blocks restrict the free movement of goods and people, severely impeding economic development and integration. Persisting discontent over poor living conditions, inadequate compensation and limited employment opportunities for former combatants has led disgruntled security forces to engage in more lucrative criminal activity, transforming them into agents of insecurity in a number of countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea.

D. Cross-border issues

15. With their fragile economies and weak Government institutions, West African societies are particularly vulnerable to corruption and lawlessness. Some countries, such as Guinea and Guinea-Bissau and the countries of the Sahel region, have even become particularly fertile ground for organized crime. Drug trafficking, with cocaine shipments transiting from Latin America on their way to Europe, constitutes the most widespread cross-border criminal activity in the subregion. In some cases, drug trafficking networks have permeated government structures and security forces. In addition to narcotics, human trafficking affecting women, children and migrants in particular is another growing trend and concern. With an estimated 10 million light weapons still circulating throughout the subregion, the continuing proliferation of small arms also contributes to fuelling criminal activity. Combating organized crime will require continued strengthening of the subregion's capacity for enforcing law and order, which remains weak.

16. Meanwhile, the potential eruption of border conflicts remains another area of concern in a region where, as in other parts of the continent, many international borders have yet to be delimited and demarcated. Increasing incidences of disputes over land and natural resources, and inter-ethnic violence can have serious implications and lead to increased tension between neighbouring States. Joint cooperation on cross-border issues therefore remains essential if a peaceful settlement of ongoing boundary disputes is to be secured, as was the case between Benin and Burkina Faso on 7 March.

17. The crisis in the Sahel region, in particular northern Niger and Mali, is emerging as one of the most pressing threats to peace and security in West Africa. It

is multidimensional, combining issues such as poverty, climate change and governance. In addition to being home to rebel activity, it has also proven to be a breeding ground for cross-border crime. Drug trafficking, arms smuggling and irregular migration, particularly along trans-Saharan caravan routes, are on the rise. By providing armed groups with additional sources of funding, these criminal activities have accentuated the volatility of the region. This situation is worsened by the emergence of terrorist factions that are taking advantage of porous borders and the prevailing insecurity and economic deprivation to indoctrinate vulnerable unemployed youth to pursue their aims outside the control of State authorities. The increasing blurring of lines between criminal, rebel and terrorist activities further complicates efforts to address this situation.

18. The humanitarian implications of the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel, coupled with the widespread use of landmines, have been considerable. Severe limitations to humanitarian access have added yet more hardship on civilian populations affected by successive years of natural disasters and food insecurity. The tendency of Governments to opt for a military solution to address rebel and terrorist activity in the Sahel constitute a further drain on development, as sparse resources are shifted away from development projects in favour of security priorities. In light of the multifaceted nature of the challenges facing the Sahelian band, and in order to prevent the region from spiralling into further violence and insecurity, concerned countries must engage urgently in concerted action to tackle these issues, with the support of the international community.

III. Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa

19. The activities of UNOWA during the reporting period were guided by the revised mandate of the Office and the recommendations contained in my last report to the Security Council on cross-border issues in West Africa (S/2007/143).

A. Strengthening the capacity of the Economic Community of West African States

20. During the reporting period, strengthening the capacity of ECOWAS to help prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the subregion continued to be a priority for UNOWA. In furtherance of this aim, the Office enhanced its cooperation with ECOWAS in the areas of peace, security and good governance.

21. My Special Representative for West Africa participated in various ECOWAS special meetings, including the meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council and the 33rd ordinary summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, held on 16 and 18 January 2008, respectively, in Ouagadougou. The summit of Heads of State and Government resulted in the adoption of an ECOWAS common approach on migration and development. The Special Representative also attended the 34th ordinary summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, held on 23 June in Abuja, which focused on the need to implement concrete programmes in the area of infrastructure, particularly energy and transportation, with a view to promoting the free movement of people and goods.

22. Joint UNOWA-ECOWAS missions were also carried out to several countries of the subregion to address emerging threats to peace and security. In February, my Special Representative, together with the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, travelled to Bamako, Accra, Ouagadougou and Cotonou to discuss threats to peace with Heads of State together with proposals for improving the emergency response capacity of ECOWAS.

23. In February, March and May, the UNOWA military advisers participated in planning conferences for a command post exercise of the ECOWAS standby force that was held in Bamako from 15 to 21 June. In recognition of that support, ECOWAS requested UNOWA to step up its assistance from observation to evaluation of the development of ECOWAS military capabilities. UNOWA military advisers also attended the ECOWAS chiefs of defence staff conference in Banjul on 19 and 20 March, where they exchanged views with ECOWAS on military cooperation in the subregion, which were later shared with other United Nations missions in West Africa, while advancing the process for their formal inclusion within the ECOWAS early warning system (ECOWARN).

24. Cooperation with ECOWAS in the field of conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding was also a major focus of the mission of the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs to West Africa from 9 to 21 May. Priority areas for cooperation were defined as the Sahel, elections, food insecurity, cross-border crime and socio-economic issues. Building upon those discussions, my Special Representative and the President of the ECOWAS Commission agreed on adopting common approaches and joint actions on those issues at the extraordinary ECOWAS ministerial meeting held from 19 to 21 May in Abuja.

25. In order to assist ECOWAS in promoting good governance practices, including the effective management of natural resources in the subregion, UNOWA attended a workshop organized by ECOWAS from 17 to 19 April to validate its draft mining code, where it provided advice and expertise in the preparation of the draft document.

B. Other subregional cooperation

26. During the period under review, UNOWA liaised with and assisted other key partners in their efforts to promote peace and stability in the subregion. My Special Representative held consultations with the International Contact Group on the Mano River Basin at its sixteenth working session in Monrovia on 15 May. At the thirteenth ministerial Troika meeting between ECOWAS and the European Union (EU), held in Luxembourg on 28 April, particular attention was paid to the need for subregional strategies to address youth unemployment, migration and drug trafficking. Both ECOWAS and the EU expressed concern at the increase in price of basic commodities and its consequences for West Africa. They further agreed to combine their efforts in addressing this crisis by holding a meeting of Ministers of Agriculture, Finance and Trade in Abuja on 19 and 20 May, where my Special Representative encouraged the countries of the region to revitalize agriculture and the rural economy in West Africa.

27. Following the conclusion of the fourth working session of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau, held on 5 May, the President of Cape Verde met with my Special Representative for West Africa, my Representative for

Guinea-Bissau and the President of the ECOWAS Commission to discuss the challenges facing the subregion and Guinea-Bissau in particular. They agreed on the urgent need for concrete action to address the food crisis and stressed the importance of adopting concerted approaches to tackle the problems facing West Africa.

28. My Special Representative also attended the meeting of the Mano River Union Council of Ministers and the summit of Heads of State and Government of the Mano River Union, held on 14 and 15 May, respectively, where he expressed the full commitment of the United Nations to promoting cooperation in the Mano River basin in areas such as good governance, development and integration. In light of the strong demand for United Nations support, UNOWA should be more actively involved in the future in mobilizing leaders of the region, fostering cooperation in support of stabilization efforts and building the institutional capacity of the Mano River Union.

C. United Nations inter-institutional cooperation

29. In line with its mandate and in response to my recommendation for greater inter-institutional cooperation in my latest report on cross-border issues in West Africa, UNOWA was, in the reporting period, actively involved in facilitating linkages within the United Nations system in the subregion, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its network of country offices in West Africa.

30. The continued sharing of UNOWA assets with other United Nations entities in the region has allowed to maximize the efficient use of resources and minimize costs. UNOWA assists United Nations delegations and senior officials transiting through Dakar and provides aviation support services to other United Nations missions and agencies on a cost-reimbursement basis. UNOWA's aircraft is also used on an emergency basis for medical and casualty evacuations both within and outside the subregion. In light of the critical need for such services, it is essential for the Office to secure free use of transportation infrastructures and exemption from landing and other fees charged by Governments in the region.

31. During my visit to Dakar on 13 and 14 March to attend the eleventh session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, I met my Special Representative and other representatives of the United Nations system at both the country and subregional levels. In my meeting with United Nations agencies and organizations, I emphasized the importance of working together harmoniously to maximize the United Nations contribution to the subregion as a whole. This view was further underlined by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs during his visit to UNOWA as part of his mission to the subregion in May, during which he held lengthy discussions with my Special Representative on how UNOWA could assume a greater role in this area.

32. In the reporting period, UNOWA continued to convene high-level meetings of heads of United Nations peace missions in West Africa, bringing together my Special Representatives for West Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, to exchange views on the situation in the subregion and emerging threats to peace. Recommendations of the 12th meeting, which was held in Freetown on 28 March, focused on the need for UNOWA to urgently engage

ECOWAS on the ongoing food crisis and encourage the adoption, by West African countries, of an integrated approach to tackle the problem. At the 13th meeting, held in Dakar on 13 and 14 June, the participants discussed the impact of the food crisis on the stability of the subregion, and reviewed developments in the Sahelian band in the light of increasing cross-border organized crime and the deteriorating security in northern areas of the subregion. They also exchanged views on the situation in Guinea and its possible impact on the Mano River region.

33. Similarly, a quarterly inter-mission conference attended by United Nations force commanders and military advisers was held on 28 March in Freetown and on 11 June in Abidjan, to improve information-sharing and coordination on military issues between the missions in the subregion.

34. From 20 to 22 January, the UNOWA human rights and gender unit organized and facilitated the visit of a delegation from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) tasked with operationalizing OHCHR's new regional office for West Africa in Dakar. It also participated in the third inter-mission meeting of heads of human rights components of United Nations peace missions in West Africa on 22 and 23 January in Freetown.

35. In December 2007, the Security Council referred the application of Guinea-Bissau to the Peacebuilding Commission. A Commission country-specific configuration on Guinea-Bissau was subsequently created under the chairmanship of the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations. UNOWA has been following the engagement of the Commission in Guinea-Bissau. On 7 May, UNOWA hosted and participated in briefings given to the diplomatic community in Dakar (accredited to Guinea-Bissau) by my Representative to Guinea-Bissau, by the regional head of the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and by the UNDP Resident Representative in Guinea-Bissau.

36. As Chairman of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, my Special Representative also worked to foster coherence and synergies in the work of the United Nations country teams in Cameroon and Nigeria when he visited both countries in May, with a view to strengthening the United Nations role in the ongoing demarcation process.

D. Governance

Elections

37. As part of UNOWA's extended responsibility to promote good governance practices and confidence-building measures, my Special Representative undertook a joint mission to Conakry from 4 to 6 February, together with the President of the ECOWAS Commission to attend a meeting of the national electoral commissions of ECOWAS member States. In addition to putting in place a subregional network of electoral commissions, the meeting adopted the ECOWAS handbook on elections.

38. During their visit to Conakry, my Special Representative and the President of the ECOWAS Commission also held discussions with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guinea to discuss the political situation in the country and the holding of successful legislative elections in 2008. Between 14 and 21 March, UNOWA led a needs assessment mission of the Department of Political Affairs to Guinea, upon the request of the Department and UNDP, to assess the

political situation on the ground and the progress made towards holding legislative elections. UNOWA will continue to closely monitor the electoral process in Guinea in the future in the hope that it will contribute to the stabilization of the country.

39. Finally, my Special Representative travelled to Benin in February on a joint UNOWA-ECOWAS mission to discuss with the President local elections that were held on 20 April with support from the international community.

E. Cross-border issues

Youth unemployment

40. UNOWA continues to host the West African office of the Youth Employment Network launched in 2006. The Network is a tripartite structure between the United Nations, the International Labour Organization and the World Bank set up to develop and implement global strategies to fight youth unemployment. It raises awareness on youth employment as both a political and security issue, facilitates capacity-building at the national and subregional levels, and engages with the private sector to increase its involvement in initiatives aimed at creating jobs for young people in West Africa.

41. During the reporting period, the Network resumed its study to comprehensively map out youth employment initiatives in West African countries. The mapping exercise has been completed for anglophone countries, while studies for the francophone and Portuguese-speaking countries are in their final stages of completion. Activities under its private sector initiative gained momentum with the upcoming publication of a study on the essential role of business in promoting decent work opportunities by profiling best practice examples of private sector collaboration with youth employment actors.

Irregular migration

42. During the period under review, UNOWA continued to promote an integrated subregional approach to irregular migration. In addition to engaging in regular consultations with ECOWAS and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and participating in a meeting convened by the IOM regional office in Dakar in March, UNOWA updated a study on irregular migration, integrating policy recommendations on ways of addressing the problem through a subregional approach. The study is now in the process of being finalized for publication.

Cross-border organized crime

43. UNOWA continued liaising with UNODC with a view to making an effective contribution to the fight against illicit activities and organized crime in the subregion. UNOWA military advisers participated in the 6th regional liaison meeting of UNODC, and my new Special Representative meets regularly with the regional head of UNODC to be briefed on developments related to cross-border crime in West Africa and discuss strengthened cooperation. UNOWA has been asked to facilitate a high-level visit of the UNODC Executive Director to the subregion, which is scheduled to take place from 9 to 13 July.

44. UNOWA has also been consulting with ECOWAS on its plans to hold a regional conference on illicit drug trafficking in West Africa in October 2008. They

agreed that UNOWA would play a lead role in supporting the convening of the conference and in providing United Nations input, together with UNODC and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS).

Insecurity in the Sahel region

45. In the reporting period, UNOWA continued to play an instrumental role in raising awareness of the situation in the Sahelian band, in particular through the ongoing consultations of my Special Representative with ECOWAS leaders and heads of State and Government, as well as in supporting plans for a regional conference to be organized by the Government of Mali. My Special Representative undertook a number of visits to countries of the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger), in some cases jointly with ECOWAS, to discuss with the Governments of those countries ongoing efforts to address the deteriorating security situation in the region. Those initiatives were complemented by visits of the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, in May, and my Special Adviser on conflict prevention, in June, both of which benefited from the logistical and substantive support of UNOWA.

F. Human rights and gender

46. As part of its efforts to support ECOWAS in the area of human rights and gender, UNOWA played a key role in organizing and providing technical and material support to the first meeting of the task force of the ECOWAS Gender Development Centre, which was held in Dakar from 31 January to 1 February and which resulted in the adoption of a workplan and terms of reference for the task force.

47. Further to the recommendations of the 1st inter-mission meeting of gender focal points of United Nations peace missions in West Africa that it convened in September 2007, UNOWA co-organized with ECOWAS a workshop on ECOWARN in Senegal from 27 to 29 May. That event, which brought together the head of ECOWARN, gender focal points of UNOGBIS and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, and representatives of United Nations regional agencies and civil society organizations, focused on mainstreaming human rights and gender in ECOWARN conflict prevention indicators.

48. In order to facilitate a harmonized and integrated approach to human rights and gender, UNOWA organized an experts' workshop on 26 and 27 June, which was attended by ECOWAS, United Nations regional agencies, NGOs, academia and human rights experts, to devise a common strategy and subregional action plan for conflict prevention and peacebuilding based on a human rights and gender approach.

49. In line with its revised mandate, UNOWA has begun to take initiatives in harmonizing the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) through the formulation of a subregional action plan and strategies for its implementation. From 19 to 22 May, its staff participated in a Department of Political Affairs training seminar on gender mainstreaming and implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, hosted by the World Health Organization and attended by representatives of United Nations regional agencies. Concrete proposals were made on ways to enhance United Nations cooperation on gender issues at the subregional level.

50. Cooperation with other partners for harmonized approaches to human rights and gender continued to be enhanced during the reporting period. Regular meetings were held with regional partners such as United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, non-governmental organizations, representatives from the Government of Senegal and the Senegalese National Human Rights Commission. Those working sessions allowed for the sharing of information and guidance for concerted and integrated approaches to human rights concerns.

G. Food security and humanitarian issues

51. In light of the fact that humanitarian concerns have a significant bearing on political developments, and vice versa, the monitoring of humanitarian developments in the subregion constitutes a priority area of UNOWA work. My Special Representative works in close coordination with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for West Africa, whose Director serves as his humanitarian adviser and accompanies him on good offices missions to highlight the humanitarian dimension of peace and security issues. The relatively increased stability in the subregion has resulted in a decreasing incidence of humanitarian crises, thereby enabling the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to draw down its large-scale repatriation operations in West Africa.

52. On 17 January, my Special Representative briefed the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs on the situation in the Niger. In addition to reiterating the commitment of UNOWA to supporting the humanitarian community across West Africa, he stressed the need to ensure effective linkages between political, security, development and humanitarian actors and urged United Nations country teams in the Niger and Mali to reinforce their interaction with ECOWAS.

53. With regard to the food crisis, UNOWA and my Special Representative have in the past few months been actively involved in advocacy initiatives, engaging West African leaders on the need for decisive international action to tackle food insecurity. In a meeting with the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Blaise Compaoré, on 7 May, my Special Representative reiterated the commitment of the United Nations to play a lead role in the mobilization of resources and in addressing urgent, medium and long-term needs. He also addressed the extraordinary ECOWAS ministerial meeting on rising food prices in Abuja, held on 19 and 20 May, where he stressed the need to revitalize agriculture and the rural economy as the best way to address the core issues of food security, unemployment and rapid urbanization. He also stressed the importance of addressing both internal and external factors in resolving the current food crisis. My Special Representative intends to mobilize the United Nations system in West Africa in support of subregional efforts to develop concerted and coordinated responses to the crisis.

H. Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

54. In his capacity as Chairman of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, my Special Representative chaired the 21st and 22nd meetings of the Commission, held in Yaoundé on 13 and 14 March and in Abuja on 19 and 20 June, respectively. The first meeting resulted in the Commission finalizing the issue of the maritime

boundary line between Cameroon and Nigeria. At the 2nd meeting, the parties agreed to provide information on offshore oil and gas resources, made plans for the upcoming transfer of authority in the Zone of the Bakassi peninsula, and discussed further confidence-building measures. My Special Representative also attended the 12th summit of Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in Abuja on 27 March, where participants expressed deep concern at environmental degradation in the Lake Chad basin, which includes decreasing water levels, deforestation, desertification and soil erosion, and at its impact on biodiversity and the livelihoods of local populations.

55. During the month of May, my Special Representative travelled to Nigeria and Cameroon to discuss the activities of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission with high-level Government officials, and strongly urged both sides to recommit to an effective and peaceful implementation of the 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the 2006 Greentree Agreement settling the boundary dispute between the two countries and defining the modalities for the transfer of authority in the Bakassi peninsula in August 2008. In response to an appeal by the Nigerian Government, my Special Representative initiated the dispatch of a needs assessment mission to assist the Government in its efforts to resettle the affected population from Bakassi. Similarly, discussions with the Cameroonian authorities centred on providing greater assistance to affected populations and increasing confidence-building measures, such as through the promotion of joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation.

56. Meanwhile, UNOWA continues to provide support to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission in the area of human resources, logistics and financial support. During the period under review, the Office facilitated field missions undertaken along the land boundary by United Nations surveyors and a cartographer, and provided logistical and administrative support to the missions of Commission observers to the Bakassi peninsula.

IV. Observations and recommendations

57. Most West African countries find themselves at present in a period of transition from conflict to peace consolidation. Despite efforts to consolidate peace, many of them remain fragile and vulnerable to outbreaks of renewed violence. If their long-term stabilization is to be secured, their peacebuilding efforts require the sustained support of the international community, and the United Nations in particular. A greater role for a coherent and integrated United Nations is being sought across the subregion for maximized results and greater impact in addressing the many challenges at hand. The ability of the United Nations to meet expectations in terms of assistance and coordination will be key if the Organization is to preserve its efficacy and influence in the subregion.

58. UNOWA will need to continue to play an active role in mobilizing support to the region. The Office will work to increase awareness of and facilitate concerted and integrated action on subregional issues considered to be the root causes of instability in West Africa. It will also contribute to harmonizing the programmes of United Nations entities operating in the region, promoting synergies and strengthening commitment to supporting peace efforts.

59. In the period ahead, UNOWA will remain committed to fulfilling its mandate as revised on 21 December 2007 (see S/2007/754) and to implementing recommendations contained in my report of 13 March 2007 (S/2007/143) on cross-border issues in West Africa and other relevant reports. Its activities will focus on priority areas for the subregion, including addressing capacity-building, peace consolidation, and cross-cutting and cross-border challenges. In particular, UNOWA will engage more actively in building the capacity of countries of the subregion and their institutions in areas such as security sector reform, the rule of law and good governance. Special attention will be given to cooperation with ECOWAS to facilitate peaceful electoral processes, particularly in countries where elections risk derailing the democratization processes and threatening subregional stability. In this regard, the Office will continue to support ECOWAS efforts to strengthen its electoral capacity and implement its handbook on elections.

60. On security sector reform, UNOWA will undertake broad consultations to facilitate the adoption of an ECOWAS strategy by emphasizing the importance of a subregional approach to this issue. Particular attention will also be placed on transitional justice and the fight against impunity, as well as on building the capacity of judicial systems in West African countries. Together with ECOWAS, UNOWA will undertake advocacy and sensitization efforts to promote ratification of legal instruments and will continue to encourage subregional strategies for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

61. In order to avoid the resurgence of old conflicts or the emergence of new ones, UNOWA will need to strengthen its collaboration with ECOWAS and others to enhance the effectiveness of early warning systems and other conflict-prevention mechanisms. It will continue to work with the Peacebuilding Commission with a view to promoting a holistic approach to peacebuilding in the countries under its consideration, namely Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. My Special Representative will also continue to use his good offices in supporting mediation and reconciliation efforts when and where they may be needed. The Office will devote particular attention to the States considered to be most prone to internal turmoil, and will remain actively engaged in making sure that their democratic processes proceed smoothly to overcome their political challenges.

62. Cross-border threats to peace and stability in the subregion will require renewed awareness-raising efforts. These efforts should focus on enhancing cooperation with key partners to strengthen capacities and develop effective strategies to address these threats. In this respect, UNOWA will continue to work closely with ECOWAS, United Nations agencies and other relevant organizations in seeking long-lasting solutions to the multidimensional crisis in the Sahelian band.

63. In sensitive border areas, UNOWA will work with ECOWAS to promote and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes and recommend confidence-building measures such as joint military patrols and regular consultations with affected populations to minimize violent incidents. It will also engage with the African Union and ECOWAS for improved cooperation on the implementation of border programmes. In tandem with ECOWAS, UNOWA will further develop its relations with the Economic Commission for Africa, the African Development Bank, the West African Economic and Monetary Union, and other regional institutions to address cross-border issues. In particular, it will intensify its efforts, in cooperation with

UNODC and other concerned institutions, to combat the growing scourge of cross-border crime.

64. In view of the far-reaching destabilizing impact of the current food crisis on the subregion, UNOWA will continue to raise awareness of the problem and promote concerted solutions addressing short- and long-term needs through sustained engagement with Governments, United Nations agencies and civil society.

65. As Chairman of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, my Special Representative will continue to promote the smooth and peaceful implementation of the ICJ ruling and Greentree Agreement so that the settlement of this border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria can serve as a model for West Africa. He will pursue efforts to encourage coordination between United Nations country teams in Cameroon and Nigeria in support of confidence-building measures envisaged in the settlement process.

66. The continued interest and support of the Council in addressing challenges in West Africa remains crucial for the subregion. I am confident that West Africa will continue to benefit from the Council's steadfast engagement with a view to further consolidating achievements in the area of peace and security. In this regard, UNOWA will maintain regular contacts with representatives of member States of the Council in the subregion.

67. In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to the Governments of the West African States, ECOWAS, particularly its Chairman and the President of its Commission, and the Mano River Union for their support. I also extend my gratitude to the United Nations system, especially resident coordinators, country teams, peace operations, and regional agencies, and to civil society organizations and other subregional partners for their continued cooperation with UNOWA. I commend Cameroon and Nigeria for their ongoing commitment to the peaceful implementation of the ICJ ruling and contributing countries for their support to the process. I would like to thank my previous Special Representatives, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and Lamine Cissé, for their strong leadership and contributions to the consolidation of peace in West Africa. Finally, I thank my Special Representative, Said Djinnit, who assumed his functions on 1 April, and all the staff of UNOWA and the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission for their tireless efforts to help ensure sustainable peace and security in the subregion.



Security Council

Distr.: General
30 June 2008

Original: English

Letter dated 30 June 2008 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 5 June 2008 (S/2008/368) concerning your proposal that the troops of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea temporarily relocated from Eritrea to their home countries now be considered as repatriated has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Zalmay **Khalilzad**
President of the Security Council





**General Assembly
Security Council**

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2 July 2008

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-second session
Agenda items 108, 116 and 118

Security Council
Sixty-third year

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

**Identical letters dated 23 June 2008 from the Permanent
Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the General Assembly and the President of
the Security Council**

With regard to the letter sent by Denmark, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland to the President of the Security Council on 27 May 2008, I have the honour to request — also on behalf of the co-sponsors — the publication of that letter and discussion paper (see annex) as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 108, 116 and 118, and a document of the Security Council. The publication will serve the broad interest of United Nations Members as demonstrated at a briefing at the United Nations on 13 June 2008 related to the issue of improving the implementation of sanctions regimes.

(Signed) Peter Maurer
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

**Annex to the identical letters dated 23 June 2008 from the
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the
President of the Security Council**

We, the undersigned representatives of Denmark, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, are writing to you on the issue of Security Council sanctions.

Our countries are strongly committed to the effective implementation of the Council's sanctions regimes. The 2005 Summit Outcome document underscored that sanctions remain an important tool in the United Nations efforts to maintain international peace and security. The General Assembly further resolved, *inter alia*, to ensure that sanctions are carefully targeted, and called upon the Security Council to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them.

We appreciate the significant progress the Council has made in this area with the establishment of the Focal Point on De-listing through resolution 1730 (2006), and wish to make a contribution to the Council's future work on this important issue. We therefore submit to Council members the attached discussion paper on the idea of establishing an expert panel assisting the sanctions Committees in the consideration of de-listing requests.

Representatives of Denmark, Liechtenstein, Sweden and Switzerland had the welcome opportunity to discuss elements of this paper with the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions Committee on 5 May 2008, and were greatly encouraged by the constructive dialogue with the Committee. We hope that the Security Council will equally find interest in these ideas, in particular in the context of the upcoming renewal of the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime. We are eager to continue and deepen the dialogue on this important matter with all members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Carsten **Staur**
Ambassador

Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations

(Signed) Martin **Ney**
Ambassador

Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany
to the United Nations, *Chargé d'affaires a.i.*

(Signed) Christian **Wenaweser**
Ambassador

Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations

(Signed) Frank **Majoer**
Ambassador

Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
to the United Nations

Ulla Ström
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative of Sweden
to the United Nations, Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Peter Maurer
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations

Enclosure

Improving the implementation of sanctions regimes through ensuring "fair and clear procedures"

Discussion paper

The 2005 World Summit Outcome document (para. 109) called upon the Security Council "to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions". The Security Council subsequently expressed its commitment to ensuring such fair and clear procedures (S/PRST/2006/28 of 22 June 2006), and took a welcome step in this direction with the establishment of the Focal Point in resolution 1730 (2006).

In the context of the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime, the Analytical Support and Monitoring Team has reported on legal challenges faced by Member States in domestic and international courts. In January 2008, the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice in his advisory opinion on two cases, which are still pending before the ECJ, argued that the Security Council's designation process under the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime did not respect the human rights of the designated individuals, groups and entities, and that it would therefore not be acceptable for the EU to take over United Nations designations without substantive review. Furthermore, an application relating to the implementation of these sanctions was recently brought against Switzerland at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

These developments pose a risk for the effective implementation of the Security Council's targeted sanctions system. After improvements of the listing procedures, the concerns mainly deal with the de-listing procedures. These deficiencies have caused countries to hesitate with the submission of names for listing. They also underline existing concerns about the integrity and legitimacy of targeted sanctions in general. While the establishment of the Focal Point was an important step, further improvements are necessary. The Focal Point facilitates access to the de-listing procedure, though further improvements could be made in a cross-cutting manner, as was the case with resolution 1730 (2006), or alternatively with respect to individual sanctions regimes. The upcoming renewal of the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime by the end of June 2008 provides a good opportunity for improvements following any one of these approaches.

We encourage the members of the Council to enter into a dialogue with each other and with non-members with a view to making substantive improvements to the de-listing regime. Such steps should strike a careful balance between the competence and authority of the Security Council and its Sanctions Committee(s) in the area of international peace and security on the one hand, and the substantive requirements of "fair and clear procedures" on the other (cf. in particular the criteria enumerated in the letter of the Secretary-General of 15 June 2006).

The annex contains draft elements for discussion which could be helpful in striking said balance. Their core element is the suggested involvement of an advisory panel during the substantive phase of the de-listing procedure. Through its advisory function, such a panel would facilitate the dialogue with the petitioner and improve the regard for due process principles, as well as assist in improving consideration of the merits of the case, without prejudice to the decision-making power of the Sanctions Committee.

Annex

Elements for draft supplementary guidelines for the examination of Sanctions Committees' listing decisions

Scope of application

1. The following Supplementary Guidelines shall apply to decisions of the Security Council or any Committee established by the Security Council (Sanctions Committee, hereinafter the Committee) which make individuals, groups, undertakings or entities (the addressees) the object of restrictions (targeted sanctions) concerning their economic assets, economic transactions or freedom of movement (listing decision). A list of Security Council resolutions to which these Guidelines apply, to be amended every time this is rendered necessary by the adoption or amendment of a relevant resolution, is contained in the Annex to these Guidelines.¹

2. These Guidelines are without prejudice to the right of any State to request a de-listing as provided by the relevant rules or guidelines applicable for the Committee in question.

Periodic review

The Committee shall ex officio keep the listing decisions under constant review, re-evaluating them on a regular basis, the intervals to be decided by the Committee, in particular in the light of new information submitted by Member States.

Panel

1. There shall be established a panel of [three/five] independent, impartial and judicially qualified persons for the purpose of examining listing decisions. The members of the panel shall be persons of high moral character and integrity and have proven experience in dealing with sensitive and confidential information.

2. The members of the panel will be proposed by the Secretary-General out of a list of candidates submitted by the Member States of the United Nations. They shall be appointed by the Security Council for a non-renewable term of [five] years.

3. The designating State(s) and the State(s) of residence and/or citizenship of the petitioner may each designate one ad hoc member of the panel.

¹ Resolutions 1132 of 8 October 1997, 1171 of 5 June 1998, 1267 of 15 October 1999, 1333 of 19 December 2000, 1390 of 16 January 2002, 1455 of 17 January 2003, 1483 of 22 May 2003, 1493 of 28 July 2003, 1521 of 22 December 2003, 1526 of 30 January 2004, 1532 of 12 March 2004, 1533 of 12 March 2004, 1584 of 1 February 2005, 1591 of 29 March 2005, 1596 of 18 April 2005, 1617 of 29 July 2005, 1636 of 31 October 2005, 1643 of 15 December 2005, 1649 of 21 December 2005, 1698 of 31 July 2006, 1718 of 14 October 2006, 1727 of 15 December 2006, 1735 of 22 December 2006, 1737 of 23 December 2006, 1747 of 24 March 2007.

Request for de-listing

1. Listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities (the petitioner) may request a de-listing decision through the Focal Point or through the State of residence or citizenship. The petition shall be made in writing in one of the official languages of the United Nations and shall state the factual and/or legal grounds which in the view of the petitioner require de-listing.
2. Individuals, groups, undertakings or entities other than those listed may request a de-listing decision if they are personally and directly affected by the respective listing.

Examination by the panel

1. The Focal Point forwards the petition to the panel and informs the Committee about it.
2. The Committee may at any time decide a de-listing. In this case, the procedure before the panel is discontinued.
3. The panel examines the petition in a preliminary way. It rejects a petition without further examination where it finds that
 - the petition is made by an individual, group, undertaking or entity which is not listed or not entitled to request a de-listing,
 - the petition is a repetition of an earlier petition and does not put forward any new evidence or circumstances justifying a de-listing;
 - the petition is manifestly ill-founded.
4. If the petition is admitted, the panel shall, within [two] weeks after admitting the petition, request the Committee and all United Nations Member States to submit, within [one] month, any relevant additional evidence or information.

Cooperation with the panel

The Committee, all Member States of the United Nations and all relevant international organizations shall cooperate with the panel to the fullest extent possible, in particular by providing any relevant information or evidence. The panel shall take the necessary measures to facilitate the receipt of information or evidence provided to its members on a confidential basis. Where a Member State or international organization is not in a position to submit relevant confidential information, it shall make every effort to submit other relevant information or evidence as detailed as possible.

Procedure before the panel

The procedure before the panel shall be governed by general principles of international law concerning fair procedure. The panel shall decide freely to use all information and evidence it deems appropriate. The panel shall take all necessary measures to ensure the confidentiality of information provided by Member States in accordance with the terms agreed with that State or the relevant standard practice. This does not preclude the panel from disclosing information or evidence to the petitioner which is not confidential, or new evidence or information which the panel itself generated using confidential information.

Reports and recommendations of the panel

1. Within [three] months after receiving the petition, the panel shall report its findings to the Committee. It recommends de-listing where the information and evidence available to the panel members does not justify the listing. Else it recommends the rejection of the petition.
 2. The petitioner and his/her State of residence and/or citizenship shall be informed by the panel about the content of its recommendation.
 3. A summary report with the recommendation(s) of the panel shall be published together with the decision(s) taken by the Security Council taking due account of the need to protect confidential information.
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**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
2 July 2008

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-second session
Agenda item 22
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-third year

**Letter dated 25 June 2008 from the Permanent Representative of
Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 25 June 2008, addressed to you by Kemal Gökeri, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 22, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Baki İlkin
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 25 June 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 10 June 2008, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/62/882-S/2008/389), which yet again contains well-known allegations of violations of "international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus", and to bring to your kind attention the following.

As stated in our previous communications addressed to you, habitually repeated allegations by the Greek Cypriot side of so-called "airspace violations" are totally unfounded and are rejected in toto by our authorities. The present allegations do not merit a detailed reply as they are of a similar nature. However, I wish to emphasize, once again, that flights within the sovereign airspace and flight information region of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the appropriate authorities of the State. The Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say over flights within the national airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that allegations of so-called violations of air traffic regulations are invalid, as the civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the only competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services.

The Greek Cypriot administration should be reminded, once again, that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey. I also deem it imperative to point out, once again, that the attitude demonstrated by the Greek Cypriot representatives in their constant repetition of false claims is nothing more than rhetoric, which unfortunately wastes the precious time and energy of the international community.

Lastly, I would like to take this opportunity to underline once again that the two sides in Cyprus have a considerable body of work and established parameters for the settlement of the Cyprus problem at their disposal. To this end, the Turkish Cypriot side is prepared to engage in a new process of negotiations for reaching a lasting settlement in Cyprus on the basis of a new partnership, political equality of the two peoples, bizonality and the equal status of the two constituent States.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 22, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Kemal Gökeri
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
2 July 2008

Original: English

**Letter dated 2 July 2008 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the Security Council**

I am writing to you regarding an urgent matter pertaining to peace and security.

Earlier today, around noon local time, three Israeli women were killed and at least 50 more civilians were injured when a Palestinian terrorist drove a bulldozer into pedestrians and vehicles, and ploughed into two buses in downtown Jerusalem, the capital of Israel.

The timing of this brutal terrorist attack, amid continued negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, underscores the extent to which the extremists will go to murder and maim Israeli civilians and destroy all efforts to secure peace and stability in the region. Moreover, this attack reveals yet again the malignant hatred for Israelis and the gross zeal to commit acts of violence and terrorism that has disturbingly taken root in some parts of Palestinian society, which greatly threatens the prospects for genuine peace, reconciliation and mutual understanding. Indeed, Hamas and other terrorist groups have already justified this vicious act of terrorism, inciting others and laying the groundwork for more violence, hatred, and suffering.

I wish to point out that today's terrorist attack occurred only hundreds of metres away from the Mercaz Harav yeshiva, where on 6 March 2008, a terrorist infiltrated the seminary's library and study hall and killed eight young men. If you recall, the Security Council could not reach consensus and condemn that unquestionable act of terrorism owing to the political opposition of one Member State in particular. This was in spite of the Secretary-General's own unqualified condemnation and the efforts of many Council members and the Council's long-standing practice of condemning terrorism.

Surely, there can be no excuse or explanation for this terrorist attack, or any terrorist attack for that matter. Any attempt to justify terrorism — including by hindering its condemnation — is disingenuous, counterproductive and morally reprehensible. Today's attack is part of the daily reality of terrorism in Israel and poses a grave threat to the humanitarian welfare of Israeli civilians as well as to peace and security. Hence, the Council must act deliberately and expeditiously to condemn, unequivocally and unconditionally, this terrorist attack and call for an end to all terrorism and violence.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Daniel Carmon
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

